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Abstract
Dating back to Veblen (1899), theoretical and empirical studies about conspicuous consump-
tion have largely stipulated associations between social status and income. This paper focuses
on the supply of status and tests the underlying assumption by using a data on the attractiveness
ratings for the World Cup 2010 athletes from the social networking website BeautifulPeople.com.
Treating the data as a team-player panel, we nd that the 32 country xed e¤ects are positively
associated with GDP per capita, even after controlling for the teams ex ante Fédération Inter-
nationale de Football Association (FIFA) rank, Gini coe¢ cient, and number of internet users.
Furthermore, there is no obvious correlation between each countrys GDP per capita and its
FIFA rank, which suggests that income is related to these "status" xed e¤ects through some
direct channel. In other words, there is indeed a link between a countrys social status and its
economic development. We caution though that income is not an exclusive driver of status, as
ability, age, game outcome and race also matter.
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1 Introduction
People engage in conspicuous consumption as a means to signal their wealth, which in turn, confers
social status. Status provides society its hierarchical structure and has an intimate role in corporate
charity, housing, luxury goods, branding strategies, marriage markets and career outcomes. In
general, the implications of social status are profound1, as they a¤ect which members of society
receive priority access to resources, and have the most inuence on important social policies. Much
of the theoretical literature has developed and extended Veblens (1899) framework2, while empirical
work has been primarily focused on uncovering behavior consistent with conspicuous consumption3.
This paper takes a step back and asks a more fundamental question: Is there actually a link between
(subjective) social status and wealth? There are many reasons why one may not answer "yes" to
this question. For example, a fashion model has a higher social status than her photographer, even
though the photographer may make more money than her; and a University professor eating at a
McDonalds has a higher social status than the stores operator, even though the operator likely
earns more money4. Clearly with more time, many more examples can be generated on a similar
note.
Answering this question is not trivial, because subjective measures of social status are hard to
come by. However, the latest marketing e¤ort by the social networking website BeautifulPeople.com
during the Fédération Internationale de Football Associations (FIFA) 2010 World Cup provides
us a unique opportunity to evaluate the association between wealth and social status. We are
motivated by von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplans (2008) study that attempts to identify predictors
of male status from their photos. They focus on a community which lacks material wealth, and
instead, relies on hunters for sustenance. Us, on the other hand, focus on how the developed world
views these international players.
BeautifulPeople.com recently asked the general public to rate the attractiveness, on a scale of 1
1The failure to achieve status has been used to explain the high suicide rates in South Korea (The Economist,
2010).
2Veblens work was formalized by Bagwell and Bernheim (1996). Extensions of the standard conspicuous consump-
tion model: dynamics (Friendman and Ostrov, 2008); implications on growth (Corneo and Jeanne, 1999); poverty
traps in the presence of conspicuous consumption (Moav and Neeman, 2010); strategic consumption (Hopkins and
Kornienko, 2004); and taxation of conspicuous goods (Corneo and Jeane, 1997).
3Some notable examples include: purchase decisions for cosmetics (Chao and Schor, 1996); implications of "Veblen
e¤ects" on work hours (Bowles and Park, 2005); investment in art that yields negative returns (Mandel, 2009);
consumption of visible goods among African-Americans (Charles, Hurst and Roussanov, 2009); a taxonomy of those
who do and do not purchase quiet/loud brand-name products (Han, Nunes and Dreze, 2010); and whether Black
students "act white" á la academic achievement as a means to gain status (Fryer Jr and Torelli, 2010).
4These examples draw from the sociological idea of status inconsistency - a lack of correlation between di¤erent
proxies of status, such as those based on socioeconomic background and prestige.
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to 10, of all the active players in this years tournament. This measure provides us a social status
proxy for how the public (from English speaking and developed nations) perceives each player. We
do not, however, try to evaluate the e¤ect of each players salary on his perceived attractiveness,
as a majority of these players belong to professional teams and are paid well above their countrys
average citizens. Instead, we control for player specic attributes, which in turn allows us to
estimate country specic e¤ects on a players attractiveness. The xed e¤ect can be interpreted
as a countrys social status, since it reects the publics overall view of each teams attractiveness.
With these estimates, we are able to see that GDP per capita has a signicant and positive e¤ect
on a countrys social status, even after controlling for the countrys FIFA ranking, level of income
inequality and number of internet users.
Furthermore, we nd no obvious statistical relationship between each countrys GDP per capita
and its FIFA ranking. Since each countrys performance is not directly related to wealth, one cannot
say that GDP per capita is only a¤ecting social status through performance. The relationship
between these two variables appears to be more direct, which supports the Veblen view that their
relationship is rather intimate.
This "beauty contest" allows the public to stratify and rank the population of World Cup soccer
players. To that end, we are studying the supply of status. Most of the empirical and theoretical
literature focuses on the incentives behind conspicuous consumption, or as one may put it, the
demand for status. A typical reduced form model for the demand for status has an agent choosing
the optimal amount of visible consumption so as to signal his or her wealth to others. How an open
society awards this status is often opaque, and assumed to depend (almost exclusively) to inferred
income conditional of observed consumption patterns5. Although this paper does not make the
supply of status completely transparent, it does o¤er evidence suggestive that expected income is
not the only driver; most notably, we nd that age and race a¤ect each players individual status,
while a teams ability (as measured by its ranking) as well as whether it wins/loses a game have non-
negligible e¤ects on each countrys status. By collecting the attractiveness ratings before and after
the pinnacle Bronze/Gold medal matches on July 10 and 11, 2010, we can identify a "di¤erences-
in-di¤erences" treatment e¤ect of winning/losing for Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Uruguay.
These e¤ects show that Spains status increased after winning the Gold medal, while Netherlands
and Uruguays status fell after losing their Gold and Bronze medal games respectively.
5An exception is the theoretical work on ways in which to organize hierarchys in society through the use of
centralized market mechanisms, such as contests held within organizations. See Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007) for
further details and a list of relevant literature.
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Our work is most similar to recent research conducted by Swami and Hernandez (2010), who
asked 461 London residents to provide subjective ratings about the attractiveness of women and
men in Londons 33 boroughs6. The most striking distinguishing feature of our work is that we
look at the aggregate attractiveness ratings for individuals, and then, after controlling for individ-
ual characteristics, assess the relationship between country e¤ects with socioeconomic variables.
Nevertheless, our results are in line with theirs: income and attractiveness are related. Our richer
specication allows us to identify this relationship more convincingly, as well as demonstrate non-
exclusivity between attractiveness and income. Furthermore, our attractiveness rating received a
lot of attention in the media, which may have led to a large number of participants, thereby making
each players rating close to being representative of how society views them7.
Matching markets are to some extent nested within the idea of social hierarchies. The matching
mechanism requires that males and females provide preferences of the other gender. With these
preferences, stable matches can be made. With that in mind, the work by Hitsch, Hortacsu and
Ariely (2010) is also relevant. They use online dating data to identify intrinsic horizontal and
vertical qualities that males and females care about when deciding whether to reach out to their
matches. Among their many results, they nd that income matters. However, they concede that
the estimated mate preferences may not be representative of the general public. Given the amount
of publicity surrounding BeautifulPeople.coms World Cup "beauty contest," we are less willing to
make the same concession, as the number of people who provide their input is likely to be large8.
2 Data
During the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, a social networking online community, BeautifulPeo-
ple.com9 sponsored a survey to seek out the public opinion about the attractiveness of all the
players10. Anyone could enter a score between 1 to 10 for any player without signing up for an
account. These scores are averaged and displayed on a page that compiles the aggregate ratings for
each individual. On average, the ratings are quite low; most are below 5. We recorded these scores
6Their work builds on OReilly et. al. (2006), who study how general practitioners perceive the attractiveness of
their patients based on socioeconomic backgrounds. A similar study that looks at the determinants of community
attractiveness also nds that wealthier communities are more attractive (Lekwa, Rice and Hibbing, 2007).
7For example, see http://www.hu¢ ngtonpost.com/2009/11/12/beautifulpeoplecom-brits_n_355226.html. The
attractiveness online survey generated a lot of attention largely because it identied the ugliest team to be Britain,
and the ugliest player to be Wayne Rooney (of Britain).
8We have requested more detailed statistics from BeautifulPeople.com.
9As the name suggests, this online community requires that members exceed some level of perceived attractiveness,
as determined by the opposite gender of existing members. To that end, some have called this site as being elitist.
10There are 11 players for each of the 32 teams. Note that the attractiveness for the substitutes is not probed from
BeautifulPeople.com.
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on two separate dates: July 9, 2010 and July 12, 2010. In between those dates were the Bronze
and Gold medal matches, Germany versus Uruguay and Netherlands versus Spain respectively. In
the end, Germany beat Uruguay, while Spain beat Netherlands. The distribution of attractiveness
scores does not change much before and after the nals.
We supplement this data with player specic characteristics, as well as country specic charac-
teristics. Some factors that may play a role in each players attractiveness may be divided into two
categories: 1) physical features, and 2) performance. To control for variation in physical features,
we use a scientic measure of attractiveness developed by Atama Group11. Their freely available
application allowed us to upload each players photo and get a score that depends on whether the
proportions of the face are "ideal," where ideal is based on past experimental research. A high
score is assigned to faces with desirable proportions. The score ranges from as low as 5.26 to as
high as 9.15. Other physical features need to be controlled for. In addition to this beauty score,
we also collected data on each players age, race, height, and whether they have long hair12.
The attractiveness rating may also depend on a players ability and amount of exposure. We
control for these attributes by collecting information about the number of games played, minutes,
goals, yellow and red cards during the 2010 tournament13. There is also information about each
players number of international caps14 and goals. On average, players entered the tournament
with quite a lot of professional experience, with an average number of 44.
To answer our main research question, we need some measure of the income of a representative
member of each country. For that, we use the most recently available GDP per capita. Other
controls include each the number of internet users, and the Gini coe¢ cient15. From the histogram,
we see that the GDP per capita has quite a large range, especially with North Korea and the United
States in our sample. All of this information is obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
World Factbook. GDP per capita has a positive, but insignicant, relationship with the number of
internet users, as one would expect, while GDP per capitas relationship with the Gini coe¢ cient
is signicantly close to zero.
As an added control, we include each teams FIFA ranking prior to entering the tournament
as an attempt to control for ability. The top team, Brazil, has a ranking of 1, while the worst
11This application is available on the website http://apps.atamagroup.com/face/. We used the photos of players
provided by the o¢ cial FIFA World Cup 2010 homepage. These pictures were ideal as virtually all of the players had
the same pose.
12We dene hair as being long if they can cover the ears.
13For those teams participating in the Bronze and Gold medal matches, their tournament stats will be slightly
di¤erent, as they played in one additional match.
14Jargon for the number of international games participated in prior to the tournament.
15This number measures the level of inequality in a country, 1 being he most inequal, and 0 being the most fair.
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team, North Korea, has a ranking of 105. There are concerns that the ranking is largely driven by
how wealthy a country is. We nd that the relationship between wealth and ranking is statistically
insignicant.
3 Empirical framework
The rst step in our study is to identify the country level xed e¤ects. We accomplish this by
running the separate regressions for the level of attractiveness before and after the nal matches
Attractivenesstcp = +  Xtcp + !tc + "cp
where t 2 fBefore;Afterg, c is a country index, p = 1; :::; 11 is a player index, and Xtcp contains
player specic characteristics, such as those relating to physical traits and performance. Some of
the variables change before and after the nal matches for the four participating teams, such as the
total number of matches, total minutes played, goals, and penalties during the 2010 games. For all
other teams, XBeforecp = X
After
cp . Each countrys social status is captured by the xed e¤ect !
t
c.
Once we have estimated the intercept and coe¢ cients for Xtcp, we can back out !^
t
c, which is later
used in the following simple cross-sectional regression
!^tc =  + 1  log(GDP_per_capita)c + 2  FIFA_Rankingc + 3  Internetc + 4 Ginic + c
We control for a teams ability using Rankingc, the number of internet users using Internetc,
and level of equality using Ginic. If a particular country has a large number of internet users, then
there is a possibility that the countrys social status is high simply because of deterministic rating
behavior as a way to support their home team. We believe though that this should not be a large
concern, as the BeautifulPeople.com network caters primarily to English speaking users that reside
in North America or England. Finally, the level of inequality may proxy for whether a country is
elitist or not. Countries with a large Gini coe¢ cient will have a small population of people holding
a majority of the income.
What we are interested in though is the parameter 1, which should be signicant and above
zero for our estimated model to be consistent with the standard Veblen assumption that related
wealth with status. An alternative specication is
!^tc = +1  log(GDP_per_capita_others)c+2 FIFA_Rankingc+3 Internetc+4 Ginic+c
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where log(GDP_per_capita_others)c measures how wealthy all countries d 6= c are. In this
specication, we would expect 1 to be negative. The relative standing of country c will fall if the
income of other countries increases, if status is indeed related to wealth.
4 Results
There are three main drivers for an individual players attractiveness: age, whether the player is
black and the number of international games played. Older players are less appealing than their
younger counterparts, as some would expect. Age can make a player less popular for two reasons:
1) Appearance deteriorates with age; and/or 2) performance deteriorates with age. Surprisingly,
the Anaface score has a negative and insignicant relationship with subjective attractiveness. We
interpret this non-result as suggesting that the attractiveness ratings on BeautifulPeople.com cannot
be taken literally as "beauty contest" scores. Given that a males and females alike can rate the
players anonymously, whether or not a player is sexually appealing is not so relevant; especially
when some of the ratings are completed by heterosexual male soccer fans. Therefore, this subjective
measure should instead be thought of as some general proxy for each players fanfare (i.e. social
status). The negative e¤ect of age on a players status is similar to Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Arielys
(2010) nding that age of a mate is undesirable.
Being black also has a negative e¤ect on status. We are able to identify this e¤ect since there
are many non-African teams that have Black players. There are likely two explanations for this
result. We conjecture that a large number of participants who provide their input are not black;
and because race might be used as a horizontal attribute, participants nd those similar to them
more attractive. An alternative reason is North Americans and Europeans are accustomed to
"Caucasian" standards for what is beautiful. One way to see this is by regressing the Anaface score
on a black dummy. This regression reveals that being black can signicantly reduce the Anaface
score by 0.3 points.
The nal result from our xed e¤ect estimations is that experienced players are perceived to be
more attractive. Players who have had a long career in professional football will most likely have
fans. Fans of a player will hold him in high regard, especially if these fans are loyal. We do not
believe this variable acts so much as a predictor of status, but instead, an important control that
must be employed. These fans have the potential of biasing the attractiveness ratings. By using
the information about each players experience prior to the 2010 World Cup, we can reduce some
of this bias.
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These estimates are almost the same, regardless of whether we use the ratings from July 9, 2010,
or July 12, 2010. Within this short time frame, the reduced form preferences of the participants
on BeautifulPeople.com appear to be stable16.
After the xed e¤ects regression, we are able to back out the country status e¤ects. A basic
plot of this estimated e¤ect against GDP per capita reveals an upward pattern. It is premature to
conclude that GDP per capita has a positive e¤ect on a countrys status, as those countries that
have positive status are among the top football teams, such as Brazil, Italy and Spain to name a
few. This pattern motivates us to include each teams FIFA ranking in our country-level regressions
on wealth. We also reiterate that wealth has an insignicant e¤ect on ranking. Wealth does not
seem to be the main force behind whether some teams are good or not. Therefore, whatever e¤ect
that wealth has on status is more likely to be a direct e¤ect, as opposed to a second order e¤ect
through the FIFA ranking.
The regressions show that income (and income of others) have a positive (negative) and statis-
tically signicant e¤ect on status. Even with the FIFA rank included, the income e¤ect does not
disappear. Therefore, developed countries are viewed more favorable than their undeveloped coun-
terparts. This result provides us the key evidence in favor of the underlying assumptions behind
theories and empirical work about conspicuous consumption. However, we cannot say that income
is the sole proxy for status.
Our estimates also reveal that the FIFA ranking plays a large role in whether or not a country
has status. Indeed, ability seems to matter in how the public views each team. This result holds in
all four specications listed. Much like the Amazonians, status is partly determined by skill-related
attributes. A natural follow up question is: if performance matters, then is there an impact in
winning/losing a crucial game?
To answer this question, we adopt a standard "di¤erences-in-di¤erences" approach. The events
that we are interested in are the bronze and gold medal games that took place on July 10 and 11.
Germany eventually beat Uruguay to take the bronze, while Spain beat Netherlands to take the
gold. Therefore, intuition dictates that Germany and Spains statuses improve, while Netherlands
and Uruguays statuses deteriorate between July 9 and July 12. It turns out that our conjecture
is only partially correct. We calculate the average treatment e¤ect of winning/losing a game by
nding suitable control countries for Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Uruguay; they are England,
Australia, France and Mexico respectively. These control countries were chosen on the basis of
closeness in terms of GDP per capita. To obtain the di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimate, we calculate
16We were unable to get ratings for days after July 12, 2010, as the promotional website was taken down soon after.
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the change in status between the two sampling dates for the treated group, and control group. For
example, the change in status for Spain is -0.1, and the change in status for France is -0.21.
Therefore, the e¤ect of winning for Spain is -0.1-(-0.21)=0.11; which, is positive as one would
suspect. After calculating these numbers, we nd that the e¤ect of winning for Germany is
negative, and the e¤ects of losing for Uruguay and Netherlands are both negative. Aside from
Germany, the winning/losing e¤ects are what we expected ex ante.
5 Conclusion
Wealth and status are certainly related. Our study veries this claim - a ubiquitous assumption
in virtually all work that builds on Veblen. We fall short in identifying the direction of causality
between these two variables. Causality both ways may lead to poverty traps. Let us illustrate this
with an example. Underdeveloped countries will be at the bottom of the social hierarchy; and to
move up this social ranking, these countries likely have to spend a lot on a countrys equivalent
to conspicuous consumption. One may say that games such as the Olympics and the World Cup
are prime examples of conspicuous consumption on a national scale. Critics often assert that these
events bring little benet and too much cost. Economic growth in these countries may slow if a
large percentage of their budget is allocated for these events. Therefore, their status signal can
make them poorer and ever more desperate to prove their worth in society. Our results also show
that status is multidimensional, as status might be related to ability. It is hardly appropriate to
stipulate that income is the sole driver of status, as much of the literature in economics promotes.
References
[1] Bagwell, L.S. and Bernheim, D (1996). Veblen E¤ects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consump-
tion. American Economic Review 86.
[2] Bowles, S. and Park, Y (2005). Emulation, Inequality, and Work Hours: Was Thorsten Veblen
Right? The Economic Journal 115.
[3] Chao, A. and Schor, J (1998). Empirical testss of status consumption: Evidence from womens
cosmetics. Journal of Economic Psychology 19.
[4] Charles, Hurst and Roussanov (2009). Conspicuous Consumption and Race. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 124.
9
[5] Corneo, G. and Jeanne, O (1997). Conspicuous consumption, snobbism and conformism. Jour-
nal of Public Economics 66.
[6] Corneo, G. and Jeanne, O (1999). Pecuniary emulation, inequality and growth. European
Economic Review 43.
[7] Friedman, D. and Ostrov, D (2008). Conspicuous consumption dynamics. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 64.
[8] Fryer Jr., R. and Torelli, P (2010). An empirical analysis of acting white.Journal of Public
Economics 94.
[9] Han, Nunes and Dreze (2010). Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Promi-
nence. Journal of Marketing 74.
[10] Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Ariely (2010). Matching and Sorting in Online Dating. American Eco-
nomic Review 100.
[11] Hopkins, E. and Kornienko, T (2004). Running to Keep in the Same Place: Consumer Choice
as a Game of Status. American Economic Review 94.
[12] Lekwa, Rice and Hibbing (2007). The Correlates of Community Attractiveness. Environment
and Behavior 39.
[13] Mandel, B (2009). Art as an Investment and Conspicuous Consumption Good. American
Economic Review 99.
[14] Moav, O. and Neeman, Z (2010). Status and poverty. Journal of the European Economic
Association 8.
[15] Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2007). Contests for status. Journal of Political Economy 115.
[16] OReilly et. al (2006). Might how you look inuence how well you are looked after? A study
which demonstrates that GPs perceive socioeconomic gradients in attractiveness. Journal of
Health Services Research and Policy 11.
[17] Swami, V. and Hernandez, E (2008). A beauty-map of London: Ratings of the physical at-
tractiveness of women and men in Londons boroughs. Personality and Individual Di¤erences
45.
10
[18] The Economist (July 10, 2010). Exit Strategies.
[19] Veblen, T (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class. MacMillan & Co.: London.
[20] von Rueden, Gurven and Kaplan (2008). The multiple dimensions of male social status in an
Amazonian society. Evolution and Human Behavior 29.
6 Appendix
Table 1: Summary statistics for individual players
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Attractiveness before nals 4.474 0.917 2.97 7.99
Attractiveness after nals 4.304 0.97 2.77 7.76
Anaface score 7.492 0.66 5.26 9.15
Long hair 0.105 0.307 0 1
Black 0.247 0.432 0 1
Age 28.023 3.802 20 40
Height 181.577 6.464 165 201
Matches before nals 2.866 1.58 0 6
Minutes before nals 225.56 154.726 0 570
Goals before nals 0.267 0.745 0 5
Yellow cards before nals 0.355 0.571 0 2
Red cards before nals 0.017 0.13 0 1
Matches after nals 2.969 1.732 0 7
Minutes after nals 234.895 170.491 0 660
Goals after nals 0.281 0.768 0 5
Yellow cards after nals 0.389 0.622 0 3
Red cards after nals 0.017 0.13 0 1
International caps 44.443 28.656 0 137
International goals 5.884 9.045 0 56
Midelder 0.281 0.45 0 1
Defender 0.381 0.486 0 1
Goalkeeper 0.094 0.292 0 1
N 352
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Table 2: Relationship between each players perceived attractiveness with his physical and perfor-
mance characteristics. Specication (1) uses the BeautifulPeople.com attractiveness ratings before
the Bronze/Gold medal matches, while specication (2) uses the ratings after the medal matches.
(1) (2)
Attractiveness before nals Attractiveness after nals
Anaface score -0.0175 (0.0689) -0.0201 (0.0676)
Long hair -0.156 (0.162) -0.188 (0.164)
Black -0.397 (0.160) -0.395 (0.151)
Age -0.0813 (0.0173) -0.0835 (0.0169)
Height 0.000612 (0.00886) 0.000572 (0.00861)
Midelder -0.106 (0.151) -0.0895 (0.153)
Defender -0.0259 (0.150) -0.0107 (0.148)
Goalkeeper 0.345 (0.196) 0.379 (0.205)
International caps 0.00420 (0.00196) 0.00454 (0.00191)
International goals 0.00875 (0.00698) 0.00941 (0.00728)
Matches before nals -0.0104 (0.0793)
Minutes before nals -0.000532 (0.000779)
Goals before nals 0.116 (0.0730)
Yellow cards before nals 0.271 (0.0801)
Red cards before nals 0.481 (0.428)
Matches after nals 0.0203 (0.0863)
Minutes after nals -0.000753 (0.000800)
Goals after nals 0.113 (0.0711)
Yellow cards after nals 0.241 (0.0733)
Red cards after nals 0.488 (0.404)
Constant 6.500 (1.751) 6.697 (1.717)
Observations 352 352
R2 0.1834 0.1847
Clustered standard errors by team in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 3: Summary statistics for countries
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Country status before nal 0 0.58 -1.233 1.343
Country status after nal 0 0.478 -0.938 1.236
GDP per capita 20925 13987.591 1500 46400
Gini coe¢ cient 39.181 10.001 26 65
Internet users in country 23.496 43.478 0 231
FIFA ranking 26.031 23.886 1 105
N 32
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Table 4: Relationship between each countrys social status with its wealth. Specication (1) uses the
estimated social status for each country before the Bronze/Gold medal matches, while specication
(2) uses the social status after the medal matches.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before nal After nal Before nal After nal
log(GDP per capita) 0.204 0.174
(0.0710) (0.0589)
FIFA ranking -0.0119 -0.00811 -0.0124 -0.00874
(0.00333) (0.00263) (0.00331) (0.00280)
Internet users 0.00132 0.00173 0.000506 0.00144
(0.00149) (0.00124) (0.00193) (0.00166)
Gini coe¢ cient 0.00300 -0.00215 0.00640 -0.00120
(0.00842) (0.00759) (0.00953) (0.00905)
log(GDP per capita of others) -10.98 -7.661
(5.351) (4.652)
Constant -1.786 -1.412 147.0 102.8
(0.845) (0.742) (71.46) (62.07)
Observations 32 32 32 32
R2 0.5368 0.5316 0.5263 0.4924
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
Table 5: Change in status after medal matches
Country Win/Lose/No change Change in status Di¤erences-in-Di¤erences e¤ect
Australia No change 0.0084 
Germany Win 0.02 -0.26
England No change 0.046 
France No change -0.21 
Mexico No change 0.13 
Netherlands Lose -0.42 -0.4284
Spain Win -0.1 0.11
Uruguay Lose -.016 -0.03
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